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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RANIER f. HUCK, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
PATRICIA ANN HUCK, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF CASE 
Case No. 19180 
This is an appeal from a Decree of Divorce entered by 
the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court awarded defendant a Decree of 
Divorce, together with certain properties acquired during the 
marriage, custody of the minor child, temporary alimony, child 
support and attorneys' fees. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Respondent respectfully requests this Court 
affirm the District Court's determination as contained in the 
Decree of Divorce entered herein. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent is willing to accept certain of the 
statements of fact prcpounded by appellant, but not the 
conclusions drawn therefrom. Many additional statements of 
-1-
fact are contained in the appellant's arg~ments which cannot be 
accepted by respondent. Respondent 3oes not believe th3t the 
facts in this case are so uniquely different as to justify the 
application of a different set of standards governing the 
review of domestic cases. While every factual situation is 
unique to some extent, for purposes of reviewing the lower 
court's determination, there appears to be little difference 
between this marriage failure and the majority of domestic 
cases reviewed by this Honorable Court. 
The parties were married for legitimate social and 
emotional reasons. Their relationship withered to a point of 
separation and divorce. During the course of that marriage, 
the parties borne a child, acquired marital properties and 
investments, incurred obligations, and lived and progressed as 
any couple may be expected to develop. 
The respondent not only contributed as a mother to 
the parties' child and a wife to the appellant (R.632), but 
also contributed her earning capacity while at the same time 
furthering her education and career potentials. The appellant, 
although highly educated as a Ph.D in Physics, continued his 
educational interests more as a hobby than an economic ~ursoit, 
and admittedly invested substantial amounts of time managing, 
developing and maintaining real estate rental investments. 
That was his avocation and occupation. During the course of 
the marr:age, by reason of the appellant's eDployrnent efforts 
and the respondent's financial contribution to offset normal 
family expenditures, the assets of the parties substantially 
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increased. Defendant's Exhibit 9 demonstrated 19 categories of 
family expenses maintained and paid by Patricia Huck during the 
course of this marriage. In addition, the defendant paid all 
child care and medical expenses. These contributions allowed 
the plaintiff to save and reinvest income in rental properties, 
thus increasing overall equity. Patricia's contributions to 
the marraige were not by "ag•eement", as that term is implied 
by the plaintiff, unless plaintiff means the agreements 
repeated upon the marriage vows, one to another. 
During the pendency of the proceedings below, 
defendant moved with her child to her home state of California 
to secure employment and be close to her family. (R.624.) She 
obtaimed temporary employment as an all-night laboratory 
technician at a local hospital working three ten-hour shifts. 
Her net income was not sufficient to meet her monthly needs of 
$1,700.00 per month without the temporary support awarded by 
the court. (R.626-628.) 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR BY IN-
VALIDATING OR DISREGARDING THE PRENUPTIAL 
AGREEMENT. 
As restated in appellant's brief, the court found (a) 
the prenuptial agreement was coercive and therefore invalid, 
and (b) even if not invalid, the prenuptial agreement had been 
met in all of its operational terms and conditions. The 
finding 3nd conclusion of the court and its effect should be 
left to the sound discretion of the trial court whose 
discretion should not be reversed unless there i2 a clear 
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demonstration of arbitrary and capri::i')\JC c'rn'1'J 'C ,)n t:1e part 
of the court. English v. English, 565 ?.2d 409 (IJL1h "9771; 
Naylor v. Naylor, 563 P.2d 184 (Utah 1q77). 
The prenuptial agreement itself provides that if the 
parties should divorce during the first two years of marriage, 
then certain limitations to claims will be effective (paragraph 
4 of plaintiff's Exhibit 1). The agreement is silent if the 
marriage lasts longer than two years, which this marriage did. 
The agreement further provides that Patricia Huck is 
to provide all child support payments unless she can't afford 
it or is not "capable of self-support at such time". The court 
specifically found that during the pendency of these 
proceedings, defendant was in fact not capable of such 
self-support. This finding is supported by a finding 
concerning her earnings, his earnings, as well as the 
availability of cash and capital resources. 
The appellant argued that Patricia Huck would not 
have been entitled to temporary alimony if the prenuptial 
agreement were valid. Even this contention is not consistent 
with the terms of the prenuptial agreement: 
6. In the event of divorce or separation, 
Pat specifically waives alimony or separate 
maintenance support provided that she is capable 
of self-support at such time. (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 1.) 
Nowhere in his argument does the plaintiff recognize 
defendant's expenditures, the financial burden of rearing a 
child, and the higher expenses made necessary by her move to 
California. The plaintiff simply resta~~s in his brief that 
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the defendant's gross earnings should qualify her as a 
self-supporting person. The move to California, her home 
sta~e, was made necessary to secure a stable and long-term 
empl~yment opportunity. Her employment hours are consistent 
with full-time night laboratory work and her expenses, as 
testified, were within reasonable limits given the locality of 
her employment, schooling and the like. Accordingly, the court 
found she was not capable of self-support and was in need of 
alimony and child support. 
Every aspect of the prenuptial agreement was complied 
with by the Court: 
(1) All property brought into the marriage by each 
party remained the property of that party. Ranier Huck 
recognized in the Pretrial Order that Patricia Huck brought in 
a great deal more to the marriage than the mere $1,000.0C 
recited in the agreement (~Pretrial Order, R.261). Ranier 
Huck received all property listed in Exhibit "A" to the 
prenuptial agreement; 
(2) In the event of divorce, if the parties could 
not agree on a division of property, the agreement provided 
that a court of law should divide the same, just as it did in 
this matter; 
(3) Patricia Huck received custody of her child, 
even though Ranier Huck did not originally want to be bound by 
his agreement not to claim any custody under the prenuptial 
agreement. Under Utah law, such an agreement would not bind 
the court. 
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Consistent with the agreement, th0 co~rt att •mpterl to 
divide marital properties in an equitahle mJnner 1~ or.ler to 
achieve a happy and useful result to all parties concerned. 
The court exercised its discretion without abuse and in a 
manner completely consistent with the prenuptial agreement. 
Thus, the court found that the plaintiff was not prejudiced in 
any manner by the court's finding that the defendant was 
coerced into executing the prenuptial agreement. The issue of 
coercion, although addressed by the court, is moot. 
II. THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN AWARDING DEFENDANT ATTORNEYS' FEES. 
Plaintiff argues that because of a substantial 
marital property award to the defendant, and because 
defendant's net income would thus increase once she became 
possessed of that real property, the defendant could well 
afford to pay her own attorneys' fees, and thus plaintiff 
should not have been ordered to contribute the net amount of 
$2,750.00 toward payment of attorneys' fees. Plaintiff's 
argument is further exaggerated by recapping a long history of 
the defendant's "defense" of certain legal maneuvers designed 
to boot her out of house and home, and by an ultimately 
unsuccessful attempt to disqualify plaintiff's attorney from 
continuing to represent the plaintiff. 
The court made substantial findings demonstrating the 
amount of monies available to each party: the fact that 
plaintiff had available in his possession in excess of 
$19,000.00 from the sale of marital property; the fact that 
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plaintiff had substantial liquid savings accounts under his 
name and in his sole possession and control; the fact that 
plaintiff had all income-producing properties in his name and 
under his control (the properties awarded defendant have still 
not been turned over to her as of the date of this brief); and 
the fact that defendant maintained herself and the minor child 
solely on her net income and temporary support. 
The defendant, Patricia Huck, still believes that had 
her attempts to disqualify the plaintiff's attorney been 
successful, this matter would not have been litigated to the 
extent that it was. Indeed, the plaintiff's interests, held 
jointly with his attorney, were significant enough to warrant 
protection while at the same time cloud the judgment of both 
client and attorney. Although unsuccessful, Patricia Ruck 
believes that her attempts were necessary for her own 
protection. 
Defendant's attorney testified to the number of 
hours, the fee per hour, his experience in domestic trial 
relations, and the reasonableness of the fee. The only issue 
raised at trial by plaintiff concerns the number of hours and 
on what tasks these hours were expended. The court obviously 
weighed the facts in arriving at an award of attorneys' fees of 
approximately one-third of what had been requested. The award 
is c~early within the court's discretion and supported by the 
findings and facts in evidence and should be accordingly 
sustained. 
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III. THE LOWER COURT COM:.!ITTED NO ERROR IN 
AWARDING DEFENDANT CERTAI~ PROPERTTES 
AND AN EQUITABLE DIVISTON OF MARITAL 
PROPERTY. 
In accordance with the prenuptial agreement, the 
parties ultimately stipulated that each would be awarded the 
various properties belonging to them at the inception of this 
marriage. That rule was consistent with the prenuptial 
agreement and general domestic relations law. Preston v. 
Preston, 646 P.2d 705 (Utah 1982); Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 
P.2d 326 (Utah 1980). However, that rule is not, under Utah 
law, inviable. Workman v. Workman, 652 P.2d 931 (Utah 1982). 
Indeed, any increase in the value of separate property which 
occurs during the marriage is considered to be acquired through 
the joint effort of the parties under Utah law. In such cases, 
the spouse will be entitled to the value of assets contributed 
at the time of the marriage and the profits due to the increase 
will be divided as a marital asset. Preston v. Preston, ~; 
Jesperson v. Jesperson, supra. Thus, the defendant was awarded 
three real properties, having a combined total equity of 
approximately $76,000.00, which total equity included any 
credits for premarital properties belonging to her in the 
stipulated amount of $8,000.00. Compare plaintiff's award, in 
excess of $120,000.00 of properties, not including the 
premarital contributions and not including premarital 
properties held, stipulated to be plaintiff's separate 
property. It is clear that the plaintiff received by far the 
larger amount of property available for distribution. He has 
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not demonstrated, nor can he, any abuse of discretion by the 
lower court in its treatment and distribution of marital 
[Jroperty. Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 931 (Utah 1982). 
The plaintiff further contends, however, that even if 
the d~stribution of these properties was within the fair and 
equitable discretion of the court, the defendant should be 
estopped from claiming any value in the marriage whatsoever by 
reason of her conduct and by reason of the various statements 
made to the plaintiff throughout the marriage. Defendant 
responds, as she did at the trial, by denying these estoppal 
statements, which the court found in her favor, and by 
emphasizing the admitted irresponsibility and selfishness of 
the plaintiff. At page 39 of appellant's brief, appellant 
recites as a fact "it was agreed prior to the marriage that 
should the marriage end in divorce, she would make no claim as 
to the pre-existing properties in any way. (Tr. 462.)" This 
quotation leaves the Court with an impression consistent with 
the plaintiff's assertion that the marriage was solely a 
marriage of convenience and that defendant would have been 
willing to pay for this convenience if necessary. Reading one 
page further into the transcript, however, produces a more 
rational clarification when the trial court asked Mr. Huck his 
position regarding improvements made to the marital residence 
after the marriage: 
THE COURT: Supposing they proved to my 
satisfaction that that is the case, was it your 
[Mr. Huck] intention that you would take the 
f~ll benefit of those improvements? 
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ANSWER [by Mr. Huck]: I don't think that W')dld 
be reasonable, no. I would w1nt to be f3ir. 
THE COURT: I don't either. Thank you. 
The plaintiff's actions in eavesdropping on 
defendant's telephone conversations is further evidence of 
plaintiff's notions of fairness. The conversation quoted at 
pages 44 and 45 of appellant's brief is taken out of context 
(bragging to a friend), and represents three separate 
conversations taken at different times and discussing different 
subjects. While the plaintiff did not deny the conversations 
themselves, the intent, import and meaning of these 
conversations were denied as not being consistent with those 
advanced by the plaintiff. 
These conversations are the only evidence which 
support plaintiff's selfish arguments that only he contributed 
to the growth of marital property and that ~rs. Huck 
specifically waived any claim to such property. This 
contention is not even consistent with the prenuptial agreement 
which provides: 
3. It is agreed by both parties that upon 
divorce or legal separation, a mutual agreement 
as to the disbursement of property acquired 
after the marriage shall be made by the parties 
themselves or, in the event that they cannot 
agree, that they shall allow a court of law to 
divide such property under the court's 
discretion. 
That is what the court did. 
The court answered plaintiff's arguments of w3iver 
and estoppel by awarding property co the deferdant, as it did. 
The court thus i~plicitly found that there was neither an 
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explicit or implicit waiver of a known right, either 
voluntarily by the defendant or by the defendant's actions and 
deeds. The entire estoppel argument is simply an excuse to 
justify plaintiff's financial greed. 
CONCLUSION 
Patricia Ann Huck respectfully requests this Court 
affirm the lower court's determinations in all respects and 
deny any relief requested by the plaintiff-appellant. The 
lower court's determinations are, in all respects, supported by 
the evidence in the record and are not an abuse of the court's 
discretion or a misapplication of law. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 6th day of February, 1984. 
GIAUQUE & WILLIAMS 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
0701L 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICS 
A true and correct copy of RESPONDENT'S BRIEF was 
placed in the United States mail, postage prepaid, to Craig S. 
Cook, Esq., Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant, 3645 East 3100 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84109, on this cS/? day of 
February, 1984. 
